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Abstract 
 This paper identifies different patterns of latecomers’ technological learning in developing complex 
products systems (CoPS). The experiences of South Korea, China, and Brazil in military aircraft development 
are compared to explain the learning process in attaining indigenous technological capability. The military 
aircraft development programs involving international technology transfer agreements have been documented to 
investigate the technological learning patterns. We find different technology acquisition modes determined by 
latecomers’ focus of knowledge-base: technological for “make” and production for “buy”. We also find that 
these modes may influence the process of learning-by-doing. In addition, we find how the role of foreign 
partners influences technology acquisition mode. Whereas an active role results in co-production or co-
development arrangement, a passive role leads to the vitalization of reverse engineering. We also shed light on 
the role of government policy initiatives that facilitate technological learning. Lastly, this paper extensively 
documented the successful technological learning in South Korea’s T-50 and Brazil’s AMX joint venture 
projects. 
 
Keywords: Complex products systems, Latecomer technological learning, Military aircraft industry, Technology 
acquisition 
 
1. Introduction 
 Complex products systems (CoPS) are systems, networks, infrastructure and engineering constructs, 
and services that are highly costly and technology-intensive. They shape and enable modern industrial and 
economic progress with the introduction of new technology to the economic system (Hobday, Davies, Prencipe, 
2005). Most CoPS research has until recently focused on developed countries, as latecomers have shown their 
intrinsic weaknesses stemming from the high entry barriers (Park, 2012). In order to fill in this gap, we 
document the cases of KAI (Korea Aerospace Industries) for South Korea, Embraer for Brazil, and AVIC 
(Aviation Industry Corporation of China) for China that have successfully acquired indigenous technological 
capability to develop their own military aircraft (Goldstein, 2002; Vertesy and Szirmai, 2010). Although these 
three countries are generally considered as latecomers owing to their late-industrialization, Brazil and China 
have entered the aircraft industry quite early. In order to avoid the confusion on the extent of a latecomer, we 
define latecomers as firms who have been recipient of technology transfer whether through a formal or informal 
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mechanism from the beginning of their aircraft industry. 
 For latecomers, this industry presents special challenges, as it is one of the most technologically 
intensive and complex industries with a steep learning curve for new entrants (Frischtak, 1994; Smith and 
Tranfield, 2005). This is the reason why cross-border alliance in aerospace and defense sector is a common 
behavior and constitutes a significant portion of the partnerships set up in manufacturing industries (Hergert and 
Morris, 1988; Dussauge and Garrette, 1995; Garrette et al., 2009). Regardless of the challenges and difficulties, 
latecomers recognize its importance and pursue technological breakthrough with the support of foreign partners. 
Since the industry involves a wide range of technology, it has a large ripple effect across all industries. In fact, 
military aircraft industry requires state-of-the-art technology not only confined to aviation engineering, but also 
across all high-tech disciplines such as mechanical, electronic, computer science, materials, systems engineering, 
etc. Despite its importance, very little is known about how cross-border technology transfer contributes to 
successful technological learning in latecomers’ military aircraft industry (Hobday, Rush, Tidd, 2000). 
 Most of the time, latecomer’s initial learning is limited to performing production work as a 
subcontractor to major foreign integrators. Later, this is extended into absorption of design and system 
integration experiences through co-development schemes such as joint venture (Hobday, Rush, Tidd, 2000). 
However, our strand of literature suggests that this typical pattern of latecomers’ technological learning may 
differ contingent on the context of countries and industries (Gerschenkron, 1962; Pavitt, 1984; Nelson, 1993; 
Teece et al., 1997; Kim, 1998). First, the difference is derived from the focus of their knowledge-base influenced 
by industrial policy prior to the formal embarkation of the industry. Secondly, security-sensitive nature of 
military aircraft industry influences latecomers’ accessibility to external resources which is reflected in the 
extent of foreign partners’ role whether it is active or passive (Cho and Lee, 2003; Li, 2010). Thus, we posit that 
these factors may shape the patterns of technological learning in acquiring indigenous technological capability. 
 Based on these contextual factors, we identify patterns of technology acquisition mode and major 
technological advancement made through the cross-border alliance that facilitates knowledge and technology 
transfer in their respective military aircraft industry (Mowery, 1987; Hergert and Morris, 1988; Dussauge and 
Garrette, 1995). We also document milestone projects “AMX for Brazil” and “T-50 for South Korea” to shed 
light on key technological asset and skillset acquired throughout the development stages which has not been 
addressed in previous studies on latecomers’ technological catch-up in CoPS (Choung and Hwang, 2007; Jun, 
2011; Park, 2012). Lastly, we also identify the role of organizational capabilities in orchestrating latecomers’ 
technological learning in CoPS. Previous literature on CoPS mainly emphasized the role of organizational 
capabilities in creating similar projects at minimum cost which may not be applicable to latecomers’ cases 
(Davies and Brady, 2000). In fact, this conventional approach in CoPS with its emphasis on cost-minimization 
hinders us to address latecomers’ main concern raised by technological barriers throughout the lifecycle of CoPS 
(Hobday, 1995). Thus, this paper mainly focuses on the technological learning outcomes instead of focusing on 
economic outcomes of aircraft development programs involving foreign partners. In addition, existing literature 
on organizational capabilities have been applied at firm-level. However, it is important to note that latecomers’ 
military aircraft industry involves active participation of government policy makers (King and Nowack, 2003; 
Cho, 2003). In other words, existing organizational capabilities should be applied at government-level. In fact, 
three companies including Embraer, KAI, and AVIC for our study are state-owned companies in our analysis 
time frame. Thus, we find how latecomer government policy initiatives successfully facilitate technological 
learning.  
 Our study intends to contribute to the literature in three important aspects. First, while the 
conventional studies of latecomers’ technological learning in aircraft industry claim that technological capability 
is obtained after practicing some production activities, we move beyond this sequence by identifying its 
determinants. Specifically, we ask how the focus of knowledge-base affects technology acquisition mode and 
learning by doing process. For this purpose, we compare the cases of Brazil with South Korea and China. 
Second, we find how the role of foreign partner influences latecomer’s technology acquisition mode by 
comparing the cases of China with South Korea and Brazil. Third, we attempt to make a contribution to the 
literature by documenting the joint venture project “T-50” of South Korea and “AMX” of Brazil. With these 
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projects, South Korea and Brazil gained global recognition for their aerospace technologies. The cases offer 
practical methods and detailed process of project-based technological learning. Lastly, we clarify the role of the 
government policy initiatives for CoPS in orchestrating latecomers’ technological learning. We further advance 
the current operationalization of each capability by applying the recent stream of research in latecomers’ CoPS 
(Lee et al., 2009; Park, 2012; Choung et al., 2012). By doing so, we find the key success factors of each case 
from strategic, functional, and project capability-building perspectives. 
 The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 begins with the theoretical background 
by reviewing the streams of literature in latecomers’ technology acquisition strategies and organizational 
capabilities for CoPS. With the theoretical foundation, an analytical framework is built to examine the 
technological learning. Section 3 entails methodological approach and process along with brief background 
information on our cases. Section 4 compares the technology acquisition mode determined according to the 
focus of knowledge-base and the role of foreign partners. We also document the technological advancement and 
learning outcome of the three latecomers and the summary of T-50 and AMX joint venture projects. Section 5 
provides a summary of the latecomer government policy initiatives to discuss implications, followed by 
concluding remarks on our theoretical and practical contributions. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
2.1. Major determinants of latecomers’ technology acquisition strategy 
 In the past, literature on latecomers’ technology acquisition strategy focused on cross-border 
knowledge transfer mechanism. In order to imitate, improve existing technologies, and create new products, 
latecomers absorb information and know-how by collaborating with foreign partners from advanced countries 
(Pack and Westphal, 1986; Lall, 1993; Kim, 1999; Ahuja, 2000; Powell et al., 2005). Kim (1997) developed a 
framework “knowledge transfer mechanisms” which consisted of formal and informal mechanisms and 
commodity trade to explain latecomers’ learning with foreign support. Based on this theoretical establishment, 
scholars in latecomers’ technology acquisition and learning highlight the success of East Asian economies with 
their active learning strategies (Viotti, 2002). In a similar manner, Etzkowitz and Brisolla (1999) investigated the 
reasons why Brazil of Latin America had fallen behind South Korea of East Asia after an apparent head start. 
Whereas the former concentrated its resources on indigenous basic research to be thoroughly convinced of 
technological superiority, the latter focused on reinforcing its production capacities to replicate foreign partners’ 
manufacturing techniques. In spite of such evidences, the existing studies on latecomers seem to have 
accomplished little. The main reason is that most of the studies have conducted national-level analysis which 
hinders us from considering industry or firm-specific success. In addition, the limitation of the previous 
literature lies in mainly considering commodities or mass-produced goods. Although CoPS industry requires 
foreign partners’ assistance just as in commodity and mass-produced goods industries, there are some 
differences in the extent of higher technological barriers and strategic uncertainties (Cho and Lee, 2003; Li, 
2010). 
 In order to overcome the limitations, we refer to technology acquisition strategies for latecomers’ 
military aircraft industry identified by Institute for National Strategic Studies (see Saunders and Wiseman, 2011). 
Acquisition strategies consist of purchase (buy), indigenous development (build), espionage (steal), reverse 
engineering, co-production, and co-development. For the sake of theoretical clarity and unbiased analysis, we 
exclude the option of espionage (steal). Given these information sources, we can distinguish between the 
different strategies that can be employed for latecomers to acquire and develop technology. The theoretical 
literature that exists on these strategies stresses the choice between internal development and external 
development is “Make” or “Buy” approach. Whereas “Make” corresponds with indigenous development (build) 
option, “Buy” is preferred by latecomers with limited technological capabilities. These two options are closely 
related with the very first stage of the aircraft industry development and the focus of latecomers’ knowledge-
base determined by industrial policies. Whereas Asia’s national development policies were primarily focused on 
improving production capabilities, Brazil of Latin America focused upon raising the level of basic research to 
create new industries (Etzkowitz and Brisolla, 1999). In a consistent manner, whereas “Make” is available for 
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latecomers with significant resources invested in research and development, “Buy” is preferred by production-
oriented latecomers with relatively low technological resources. In general, “Buy” is the most preferred mode of 
initial acquisition, as most latecomer countries ‘begin with maintenance shops, move next to the assembly of 
imported planes, and to the manufacture under license of military planes for the local market with some 
eventually doing subcontract work for major aircraft producers’ (Moxon, 1987; Frischtak, 1994). 
 These initial acquisition strategies lead us to the subsequent stage of acquisition. Acquisition modes in 
this stage consist of reverse engineering, co-production, and co-development that are by-product of “Buy” 
option. In this subsequent stage, the degree of foreign partners’ role determined by the political relationship 
between knowledge transmitters and receivers is an important factor. For instance, developed countries often 
restricts export of the sophisticated technology such as avionics and weapon systems due to their strategic 
concerns or to maintain a technological advantage of their own (Lee, 2008; Saunders and Wiseman, 2011). 
Consistent with this fact, reverse engineering is preferably adopted by a latecomer with low level of accessibility 
to foreign knowledge-base which may be reflected in passive role of foreign partner. As a result, reverse 
engineering requires an accumulated knowledge base to proactively imitate and add a little modification to the 
original product. In contrast, co-production and co-development are facilitated when foreign partners show their 
active role (Kim, 1998; Saunders and Wiseman, 2011). Co-production refers to a contract for latecomers to 
retain their right to produce copies of a complete aircraft or key components. This deal includes assembly of 
imported complete knock-down (CKD) kits that may give latecomers an independent production capability. Co-
development refers to cooperation in the design stage of aircraft development and latecomers gain design and 
system integration expertise. The partners typically share the cost and work content. This way, the profit made 
from selling a new complete aircraft to third parties may be shared by the partners (Saunders and Wiseman, 
2011). 
 
2.2. Policy initiatives for technological learning in CoPS 
With the introduction of CoPS by Miller, Davies, and Hobday, researchers have focused on the cases 
of developed economies such as Europe and U.S. One of the main interests in their conventional studies was to 
understand the organizational capabilities required for the development of CoPS. Organizational capabilities in 
CoPS have applied ‘dynamic capability’ to explain the importance of mobilizing various resources and 
technologies for system integrators to meet and satisfy clients’ requirements (Davies and Brady, 2000). In 
contrast, Chandler (1990) proposed an organizational capabilities framework avoiding a top-down, strategic 
management view of the firm, by including non-strategic capabilities. Chandler’s work has been extended by 
Davies and Brady (2000) and Hobday (2005) to understand capabilities required for CoPS. Whereas Chandler 
(1990) addressed the importance of strategic and functional capabilities for mass-production, Hobday (2005) 
emphasized strategic and project capabilities for CoPS development.  
 Accordingly, Davies and Hobday (2005) introduced three organizational capabilities required for 
CoPS which consisted of strategic capability, functional capability, and project capability. First, strategic 
capability is defined as an ability to allocate resources and implement long-terms plans for the purpose of 
maintaining, renewing, and expanding organizational capabilities. The role of leadership in monitoring internal 
operations and adjusting strategies to a changing environment was emphasized. Secondly, functional capability 
in CoPS is structured near the technological aspects including designing, engineering, and integrating the 
diverse knowledge inputs and subsystems. Lastly, project capability is essential in managing relationships with 
partners in designing and implementing CoPS throughout the project life-cycle (Davies and Brady, 2000). 
 However, the organizational capabilities derived from the cases of developed countries may neglect 
the technological barriers faced by the latecomers (Davies and Brady, 2000). In other words, how organizational 
capabilities facilitate technological learning is the key issue to be addressed for latecomers’ successful CoPS 
development (Hobday, 1995). A few studies on latecomers’ technological catch-up in CoPS have been carried 
out by using the cases of telecommunication systems. Choung and Hwang (2007) explained that South Korea’s 
success stemmed from the critical role of public research institutions in technological evolution. In addition, Jun 
(2011) identified integration capability, network effects and the national installment base as required capabilities 
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for survival and growth of latecomers’ CoPS. Similarly, Park (2012) identified major capabilities in South 
Korea’s success as networking, knowledge base, and leveraging policies. Above all, the authors commonly 
emphasized the importance of acquiring technology from foreign partners through technology licensing, joint 
development, and joint research agreement. Nevertheless, none of the studies specifically addressed the degree 
of foreign partners’ role through which latecomers’ technological learning is orchestrated with the development 
of organizational capabilities.  
 In addition, organizational capabilities have been mostly applied at firm-level in previous literature. 
This necessitates observing the role of government in facilitating the development of organizational capability 
for technological learning. For instance, the rise of latecomer firms should be explained with latecomer 
governments’ sophisticated sector-specific policy initiatives, as these industrial policy initiatives have a wide-
ranging impact on firm-level competitiveness (Ham and Mowery, 1995; Nelson, 1995; Vogel, 1996; King and 
Nowack, 2003). Also, offset agreements are one of the most prevalent technology transfer modes in military 
aircraft industry. In fact, when arms sales involve offsets, government policies represent an important 
environmental factor that needs to be considered by corporate managers (King and Nowack, 2003). This is 
reflected in the status of latecomer firms engaged in military aircraft industry where most of them are state or 
government-owned companies. Thus, we examine latecomers’ government policies or initiatives in military 
aircraft development by applying the organizational capabilities.  
 
2.3. Analytical framework 
 This study discusses latecomers' technological learning from the perspective that the learning is 
facilitated by technology acquisition strategies and policy initiatives (See Figure 1). In order to look into 
latecomers’ technology acquisition strategy, we adopt technology acquisition mode determined by latecomers’ 
context. The first context is derived from the focus of latecomers’ knowledge-base which is explained by the 
establishment order of innovation meso-systems for CoPS (Miller et al., 1995; Principe, 2013). In this study, we 
adopt the supply-side of meso-systems composed of two main groups including the system integrators (aircraft 
manufacturers) and the innovation infrastructure (government-funded laboratories and universities, the 
suppliers). In general, latecomers’ military aircraft industry begins by building the innovation infrastructure in 
the first hand. Depending on the focus of knowledge-base determined by latecomers’ industrial policy, the 
establishment of innovation infrastructure may vary. On one hand, government-funded laboratories and 
universities are established, if latecomers’ focus is on building technological capabilities to generate and manage 
technological change. On the other hand, suppliers are established, if latecomers’ focus is on the development of 
production capabilities to produce goods at given levels of efficiency and given input combinations (Bell and 
Pavitt, 1993; Etzkowitz and Brisolla, 1999). For the second context, we adopt the role of partners in determining 
the acquisition mode. Whereas an active role of foreign partner results in co-production or co-development 
agreement, a passive role of foreign partners induces latecomers to focus on reverse engineering (Saunders and 
Wiseman, 2011). Above all, we posit that technology acquisition modes have an impact on the process of 
technological learning which is represented by “Learning by doing”. In order to capture the process, we have 
referred to the value chain of aerospace industry proposed by World Economic Forum (2013) consisting of 
design & development, logistics, raw materials, component manufacturing, systems integration, assembly, and 
aftermarket MRO (Maintenance, Repair & Operations). Since we are focusing on the dimensions of 
technological learning, we exclude logistics from our analysis. By analyzing milestone projects along with 
major technological advancement, we figure out the order of activities comprising “Learning by doing”. 
 Latecomers’ technological learning is essentially facilitated by their policy initiatives (Hobday, 1995; 
Matthews and Cho, 2000; Amsden and Chu, 2003; Dodgson, 2009). As most of aviation industry starts with the 
involvement of government, we modify the operationalization of organizational capabilities in existing literature 
to be applied at national-level. First, the strategic initiative is represented as latecomers’ national strategic 
intention to enter dynamically into technological fields with strong intent and clear goals (Lee et al., 2009; Park, 
2012; Choung et al., 2012). The intention requires promoting the necessity of R&D activities, forming an 
aerospace cluster and executing lavishing investment. Secondly, the functional initiative requires acquiring 
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broad, deep, and integrated knowledge and skills for understanding many diverse elements of aircraft. This 
initiative is represented in the form of technology policies to build knowledge base and educate human capital 
(Lee et al., 2009; Park, 2012). Thirdly, the project initiative is represented in the form of an ability to collaborate 
with various actors in order to orchestrate technological learning and product development in an efficient 
manner. Since military aircraft development features high-confidentiality and even causes political tension, it is 
important to select and work with right domestic and foreign partners (Lee et al., 2009; Park, 2012). We refer to 
government procurement and export policies as well as other relevant policies vitalizing the participation of 
multiple actors.  
 
Fig. 1. Analytical framework 
 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 This study documented the military aircraft development projects by South Korea, Brazil, and China 
to compare the difference in technological patterns between East Asia (China and South Korea) and Latin 
America (Brazil). In particular, this study investigated the patterns by observing the technological advancement 
via international technology transfer arrangements including co-production and co-development projects (See 
Figure 2). The military aircraft industries and projects of 1945-1999 in Brazil, of 1969-2012 in Korea, and of 
1952-1999 in China have been analyzed. Despite the different time period of analysis, our comparative approach 
is rationalized with the following reasons. First, the different time period of analysis does not compromise the 
comparability of this study, as the main objective of this study is not to compare latecomers’ different strategies 
to gain competitive position within the industry, but to analyze different patterns of technological learning to 
become indigenous developers. Second, the three latecomer governments have initiated their industries with the 
support of military regimes. This allows us to focus on the military aircraft development programs that have 
been the main interest of the governments during the time period of our analysis. In this sense, comparative case 
study methodology was adopted to historically analyze the overall evolution of the industry and study new 
product development involving the participation of foreign partners (Skocpol, 1979; Freeman, 1991; Dittrich et 
al., 2007).  
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 Our approach is also based on event analysis by focusing on the embarkation of the industry and the 
technological advancement via cross-border alliance events. This allows us to increase our understanding of 
latecomers’ key technological advancement through milestone projects with foreign partners (Prencipe and Tell, 
2001; Brady and Davies, 2004). However, there are some methodological concerns arising from the fact that our 
cases show the variance in the technological level of jet fighters. For instance, China produced prototypes of 
stealth and achieved its status as a producer for 4th generation jet fighters in 2000s. On the other hand, Brazil 
achieved its indigenous technological capacity to produce only a subsonic ground-attack aircraft in 1984. In 
addition, South Korea achieved the technological capacity as an indigenous developer by producing a 
supersonic trainer in 2002. 
 
Fig. 2. Generation of fighters (Tirpark, 2009) and matching of aircraft in this study 
 
Note: The military aircraft development programs in this study focus on the technological learning dynamics in 
international technology transfer programs for jet fighter development projects. The projects that have carried 
out in the form of co-production and co-development with foreign partner were selected. 
 
 This may have been due to the fact that generation of jet fighters differs depending on latecomers’ 
geo-political environment and national strategic focus. South Korea and China are focusing on defense aviation, 
due to political tensions in their respective geographic locations. In contrast, since the 90s, Brazil has shifted 
their strategic focus from military aviation to civil aviation. In fact, 90 percent of the Brazilian aircraft industry 
is derived from civil aviation, while 8.5 percent is from defense sector (Maculan, 2013). In this sense, the 
technological momentum gained with the AMX presented Embraer’s engineers with an ‘opportunity’ to exploit 
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the capabilities acquired fully, and led eventually to design civilian aircrafts in the category of CBA (Frischtak, 
1994). In fact, between 1997 and 1999, the new family of regional jets (ERJ –145 and ERJ -135) accounted for 
more than 60 per cent (195 units) of the total of 310 aircraft which has become the most important marketable 
good for Embraer (Cassiolato et al., 2002). In contrast, the successful development of T-50 have led Korea and 
KAI to develop and produce other defense-related products ranging from light attack jetfighters (T-50 families) 
and multirole helicopters “Surion”. In order to conduct case analysis, our approach captures how each country 
walked through unique paths to become an indigenous developer of military aircraft rather than comparing the 
results of producing higher generation jet fighters. 
 The approach may raise some methodological concerns over the definition of “indigenous developer 
of military aircraft”. However, there are no self-evidently obvious criteria for judging “indigenous developer of 
military aircraft”. The variation over the term is caused by procurement strategies, acquisition styles and 
philosophies, technological change, technical uncertainties, and so forth. Therefore, “indigenous military aircraft 
industry” is simply defined as having technological and production capabilities for indigenous aircraft 
development. Measuring their extent with secondary data is extremely difficult. Due to its arbitrary nature, 
interviews with engineers in product development and project managers of Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) 
and Embraer have been conducted. To be more objective, we posited that the mastery of systems integration 
leads latecomers to achieve their status as indigenous aircraft developers. The reason is that systems integration 
is a core technological capability for complex product systems which is the most difficult capability to be 
mastered (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001; Brusoni et al., 2001; Magnusson et al., 2005). 
 In addition, our historical and comparative approach also suffers from some limitations for arriving at 
universal conclusions with a process of verification or falsification (Goldstein, 2002). In fact, there exist 
variations in the time frame of each case which gives us difficulties to make direct comparisons. Still, it is 
important to approach the technological learning from evolutionary perspective to understand more in-depth and 
comprehensive view on the technological learning in military aircraft industry from different institutional 
background (Phillips and Su, 2009; Su and Hung, 2009). To overcome the methodological issues, we mainly 
have relied on secondary materials such as government reports and research articles (Goldstein, 2002). These 
secondary materials have been cross-checked through our interviews with experts. Despite the limitations, our 
approach offers insights that may be valid in the context of this study. 
 We have conducted research with the director of Golden Eagle Engineering Research Center who 
successfully spearheaded the development of South Korea’s T-50. We also have interviewed the chief engineer 
for T-50 development. Both of our interviewees were dispatched to Lockheed Martin to learn design and system 
integration know-how. With their experiences, they helped us to validate our analytical framework composed of 
technology-specific dimensions and identify the technological learning dynamics through the cross-border 
alliance. Interviews with the former chief engineer of product development at Embraer have been carried out to 
obtain data on Brazil’s jet fighter projects. Secondary data were also collected through library research to cross-
check and complement our field data (See Table 1). 
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Table 1 
Data sources for the study 
Type of data Collection period Location and data source 
Major content and data coverage 
period 
Primary Data 
Interview by e-mail 
and direct contact 
Dec. 2012-
Nov. 2013 Brazil & South Korea 
Embraer’s technological learning in 
“AMX” project (1980-1999) 
Interview by e-mail 
and direct contact 
Jan. 2011-Sept. 
2013 South Korea 
KAI’s technological learning in “T-
50” project (1989-2012) 
Secondary Data 
Annual Financial Data 
of Embraer Dec. 2013 Data Stream 
R&D investment (1985-2012) 
CAPEX (1999-2012) 
Sales (1985-2012) 
Annual Financial Data 
of KAI Dec. 2013 KISVALUE 
R&D investment (2002-2012) 
CAPEX (2002-2012) 
Sales (2002-2012) 
Annual Financial Data 
of AVIC Dec. 2013 
Data Stream, Annual 
Report 
R&D investment (2009-2012) 
Sales (2009-2012) 
SIPRI Arms Transfers 
Database Jan. 2014 
SIPRI (Stockholm 
International Peace 
Research Institute) Website 
Inward transfer of military aircraft 
(1950-2012) 
Patent data Jan. 2014 OECD Patent Database Patents filed under the PCT in air 
vehicle classes (1978-2011) 
SIPRI Arms Transfers 
Database Jan. 2014 
SIPRI (Stockholm 
International Peace 
Research Institute) Website 
Export of military aircraft  
(1976-2004) 
Other secondary data Nov. 2013-
Dec. 2013 South Korea 
Company annual reports and other 
reports on AVIC and Chinese aircraft 
industry 
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4. Paths of latecomers’ technological learning 
4.1. Determinants and patterns of technology acquisition modes 
4.1.1. Knowledge-base and technology acquisition modes 
 Brazil’s military aircraft industry is well represented by Embraer which is responsible for around 80 
percent of the production activity in the sector (Maculan, 2013). In the early years, Brazil adopted industrial 
policies to raise the level of local technological research rather than focusing on enhancing their production 
capacities. In a consistent manner, Moxon, one of the first scholars to argue the features special to Embraer’s 
development paradigm, held that “Embraer had focused on the design and manufacture of airframes, and 
systems integration and testing. Not that it was never involved in pure assembly operations of both military and 
civilian planes, or in subcontract work, but these were never the company’s main concern” (Moxon, 1987). 
Likewise, Brazil's acquisition mode was based on "Make" approach with their focus on technological 
knowledge. In order to understand the argument, it is important to address the origins of Embraer. After the 
Second World War, an influential Brazilian military general Carlos de Meira Mattos promoted ideas on 
enhancing Brazil’s international structure through the modernization of technological and industrial base 
(Sikkink, 1991). In reflection of his thought, CTA (Aerospace Technical Center) was established in 1945 to 
coordinate aerospace research activities (See Figure 3). The engineering school “ITA” (Aeronautics 
Technological Institute) was also established in 1950 with the inspiration of Air Force hero Casimiro 
Montenegro Filho. In the early years, ITA established international cooperation with MIT (Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology) and Caltech (California Institute of Technology) to make sure that the aviation sector 
would engage in self-sustaining R&D. The successful launch of education system at both undergraduate and 
graduate-level resulted in supporting CTA, the ITA’s umbrella organization, by fulfilling its demand for 
engineers. More importantly, the first president of Embraer was an engineer graduated from ITA who had 
spearheaded the development of the very first aircraft prototype “Bandeirante”. Not only the president of 
Embraer, but most of the engineers and staff of Embraer had been graduates of ITA or researchers at CTA. In 
other words, Embra, established in 1969, was a natural spin off of the CTA (Maculan, 2013). 
 In contrast, South Korea and China of East Asia adopted industrial policies mainly oriented toward 
improving their production capabilities. This is why the focus of their aircraft industry in the early years was on 
depot-level maintenance and manufacturing activities based on “Buy” approach (Heymann, 1975; Cho, 2003). 
Although there were some Chinese initiatives for design and indigenous development, much of their final work 
appeared to be imitation of their partnering country’s technology. For instance, SADO (Shenyang Aero-Engine 
Design Office) was established in 1956 which later was re-named into SARI (Shenyang Aero-Engine Research 
Institute). Aeronautical Engineering Society was also established in 1963 and promoted “design reform 
campaign” in 1964. However, the first native-design Chinese military aircraft “F-9” was appeared to have 
imitated much of its airframe and engine design from the Soviet MiG-19. In short, the successes the Chinese 
achieved were not in design technology, but in manufacturing through reverse engineering (Heymann, 1975). 
South Korea also initiated the project KTX-1 in 1988 with the support of government R&D funds and public 
research institutes. However, this national R&D program had failed even before the commercial launch, due to 
lukewarm support of the government. This may have been due to the lack of lavishing initial investment 
required to foster domestic aircraft production in the early stage. As a result, South Korean producers 
concentrated on final assembly and productions of airframes and aero-engine. Most of avionics and design-
related technology were imported directly from abroad (Cho, 2003). 
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Fig. 3. The evolution of military aircraft industries in Brazil, South Korea, and China 
 
Source: Modified from Cho (2003), Maculan (2013), Nolan and Zhang (2002) 
Note: * The establishment date of Chinese and Brazilian firms may be the same as their entrance into aircraft 
industry. However, since some of South Korean suppliers’ establishment date does not match their entrance into 
aircraft industry, we use their entrance years.  
 
Table 2 
Stylized differences derived from the origins of latecomer firms in military aircraft industry 
 Brazil - Embraer South Korea - KAI China - AVIC 
Origin of firm Research institute and 
university  
Spun-off as a state -
owned company 
Multiple suppliers  
Consolidated as one 
government-owned 
company 
Multiple suppliers  
Consolidated as one 
government-owned 
company 
Innovation ecosystem Concentrated on one 
location 
Moderately dispersed 
over few locations 
Dispersed over multiple 
locations 
Focus of knowledge-base Research Production Production 
 
 Likewise, the role of research institutes and universities for East Asian latecomers was somehow 
limited, but that of various suppliers were significant in enhancing maintenance and manufacturing capacities. 
In the 1990s, South Korea and China have consolidated the existing suppliers. South Korea and China aimed to 
transform the group of existing suppliers into an internationally competitive aviation company. For China, AVIC 
(Aviation Industries of China) was established to directly responsible for managing the industry’s assets, and 
formulating the industry’s business strategy. In a similar manner, South Korean government forced a 
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consolidation in aerospace manufacturing to drive economic reform in the late 1990s when Asian economy was 
under crisis. The three subsidiaries of Korean conglomerates including Samsung Aerospace, Daewoo Heavy 
Machinery and Hyundai Space and Aircraft were consolidated into KAI (Korea Aerospace Industries).  
Although South Korea and China have eventually pursued the national champion model of Brazil, 
there are some differences in terms of firm status, innovation ecosystem, and focus of knowledge-base (See 
Table 2). Whereas Embraer was privatized in 1994, AVIC and KAI have remained as government-owned 
enterprises. In terms of their innovation ecosystem, Brazil’s aerospace industry is concentrated around the single 
cluster “São José dos Campos”. In contrast, China has its multiple suppliers in a dozen of locations all over 
China involved with aeronautical maintenance and production work. Their locations include Shenyang and 
Harbin in the northeast, Chengdu in the southwest, and other facilities around Shanghai, Xian and Taiyuan 
(Vertesy and Szirmai, 2010). Korea also has its suppliers dispersed over several locations but to a lesser extent. 
Multiple Korean suppliers were the beneficiary of the Aircraft Industry Promotion Law in 1984 which allowed 
the new entry of the subsidiaries controlled by Korean conglomerates. 
 Above all, these differences are reflected in each country’s approach toward research and production 
activities. In order to empirically validate the difference in their focus of knowledge-base, two firm-level 
measures have been used. First, R&D intensity is the amount of R&D investment divided by annual sales. As 
indicated in Figure 4, the average R&D intensity of Embraer from 1985 to 1991 marks 26.5 percent, which is 
significantly higher than that of AVIC and KAI in 2000s. Before 1985, Embraer’s R&D intensity records 3.8 
percent in 1983 and 7.5 percent in 1984 (Frischtak, 1994).1 Even in the 2000s, Embraer focus on R&D 
activities in both commercial and executive jets. Their R&D goals include reducing fuel efficiency and using 
bio-fuel as an alternative energy source. Composite material and structures for aircraft wings and fuselage are 
also Embraer’s key focus in order to reduce the aircraft weight as much as 15 percent. In the case of AVIC, 
although AVIC is catching up with Embraer in terms of R&D intensity, its R&D intensity is incomparable to that 
of Embraer in earlier years. KAI shows its insufficient R&D activities with its lowest R&D intensity among the 
three latecomer firms. This is consistent with Cho (2003)’s observation that the level of know-how related to 
system integration design, test, and evaluation is poor. Cho (2003) also stressed the weaknesses in avionics and 
flight control due to the lack of local R&D in these areas. 
We have also developed a surrogate measure for production intensity which is the amount of CAPEX 
(Capital Expenditure) divided by annual sales. In fact, capital expenditures are integral to the operations of most 
manufacturing companies including aircraft manufacturers within aerospace industry, which must regularly 
upgrade physical assets (equipment, plant and property, and industrial building and warehouses) or acquire new 
ones in order to remain competitive (DTI, 2006). Despite the above logic, we admit that there are some limits to 
this measure, due to the lack of its confirmatory nature. However, we cannot negate the importance of using 
capital expenditure as a surrogate measure to compare the production intensity of the latecomer firms.  
Embraer shows a lower level of production intensity compared to that of KAI (See Figure 5). 
Nevertheless, it may be inappropriate to claim that Embraer has weakness in production capacity. In fact, 
Embraer strategically uses risk-sharing partnership for production activities. To sum up, we may assume from 
our empirical data that the focus of knowledge-base for Brazil has been technological research. In contrast, the 
foci of East Asian latecomers have been enhancing their production capacity which is consistent with previous 
literature on industrial policies of Latin America and East Asia. 

1
 The data on Figure 4 and 5 has limitations, as it does not address military aircraft-specific nor project-specific 
R&D intensity and production intensity. Also, the data does not exactly correspond to the time period of the 
analyses results in Figure 3 and Table 2. The limitations are derived from the absence of secondary data. Despite 
the limitations, Figure 4 and 5 are complementary in nature that still validate our claim on the different overall 
strategic orientations of Embraer (Research-oriented), and KAI and AVIC (Production-oriented). Thus, Figure 4 
and 5 may partially complement the analyses results indicated in Figure 3 and Table 2. 
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Fig. 4. R&D intensity of latecomer firms in aircraft industry 
 
Source: Annual reports, KisValue, Frischtak (1994), Goldstein (2002), Casanova et al., (2009) 
Note: R&D intensity of Embraer from 1985 to 1991 is more focused on military aircraft. R&D intensity of 
Embraer throughout 1990s is inclusive of R&D investment in both military and commercial aircraft. R&D 
intensity of Embraer from 2001 to 2012 consists of R&D investment extended to commercial and executive jets. 
Since the R&D intensity data of Embraer from 1940s to 80s do not exist, we took an inferential approach in 
interpreting the data which may still be of use to validate our claim. 
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Fig. 5. Production intensity of latecomer firms in aircraft industry 
 
Source: Thompson Datastream, KisValue, Annual Reports 
 
4.1.2. Role of foreign partnership and technology acquisition modes 
 For latecomers to build a military aircraft, it requires extensive R&D at high costs and reliance on 
subsequent demand to offset these costs. Relying solely on domestic demand is risky for latecomers, as it is 
extremely difficult for them to take advantage of economies of scale. More importantly, many latecomer firms in 
military aircraft industry encounter difficulty in acquiring core technologies. In order to acquire core 
technologies, latecomers absorb information and know-how by collaborating with foreign partners from 
developed countries (Ahuja, 2000; Powell et al., 2005). Since military aircraft industry represents security-
sensitive features, various technology acquisition strategies are used by latecomers. In particular, China shows 
its distinctive strategies in acquiring technology from abroad, as it has been isolated from access to western 
knowledge-base (See Figure 6). The history of Chinese military aircraft formally dates back to the 1950’s when 
high political tensions were created by the Cold War. At the time, China essentially had no groundwork to 
indigenously design and produce military aircraft with its limited industrial capacity and Western countries 
banned manufacturers from exporting military aircraft to China. As a result, China relied on Russia (Formerly 
the Soviet Union) and Eastern European countries that were more accommodating than Western countries. In the 
early stage, China benefited from the Soviet Union, which committed human and financial resources to 
transform its communist partner China into a self-sufficient defense partner. For instance, China purchased 
Soviet fighters in order to arrange co-production agreements and resolve technical constraints (Saunders and 
Wiseman, 2011).  
 After the Sino-Soviet split in 1960s, Soviet advisors and its technical assistance withdrew. This 
resulted in the isolation of Chinese military aircraft industry, as the country lacked relationships with Western 
countries to access cutting-edge military technologies. This forced China to focus on reverse engineering on 
aircraft that were previously purchased from the Soviet Union.Since then, access to foreign knowledge-base via 
formal mechanisms has been limited. However, with Deng Xiaoping’s open policy and reform in the late 1970s 
with the introduction of 16 Character Policy, China began to enter into a few co-production projects in 
commercial aircraft in the late 1980s. Despite the economic reforms in the 1970s which enhanced the 
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accessibility to Western technology, China still had a hard time establishing a stable relationship with foreign 
suppliers which limited itself to licensed production projects with little room to acquire advanced technologies. 
Not long after partially regaining the access to foreign knowledge-base, China faced economic sanctions 
stemming from the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. As a result, China put its efforts to purchase small 
quantities of advanced fighters and aviation components in the 80s and early 90s. However, the United States 
and other western countries had no motivation to sell even a small number of fighter aircraft to China, as reverse 
engineering was the most preferred strategy for China. In order to cope with the circumstance, China adopted a 
spin-on approach which allowed acquired knowledge on civilian aviation to be adapted to its military 
applications. In fact, Chengdu Aircraft Industry’s subcontracting facilities operated both military and 
commercial production lines close to one another (Fisher, 2004). Regardless of their hardships, China became 
capable of producing fourth-generation fighters based on reverse engineering efforts which were the by-product 
of co-production agreement with the Soviet Union and Russia. This co-production agreement provided China 
with complete knock-down kits for indigenous production. Although they made limited developments in 
genuinely new innovative technology, China benefited significantly from “follower’s advantage” through 
imitation and modification (Saunders and Wiseman, 2011). 
 In contrast, South Korea and Brazil had stable and favorable collaborations with their Western 
partners (See Figure 6). For instance, whereas China’s sub-contractors were generally able to contract for Level 
3 agreement, South Korea and Brazilian firms were familiar with Level 4 or 5 agreement involving co-financing 
and co-designing (Nolan and Zhang, 2002). This is consistent with the argument that with the reputation earned 
from co-production arrangement, a form of co-development scheme such as joint venture project is realized for 
latecomers (Luo and Tung, 2007). The main difference between Brazil and South Korea’s technology 
acquisition lies in the fact whereas the former relied on a number of foreign actors including research institute 
and universities; the latter was somehow dependent on foreign suppliers. Embraer established a procurement 
agreement with NASA to transfer information on wing sections and foreign universities for training highly 
qualified engineers in research skills. Embraer also entered into an agreement with a general aircraft 
manufacturer “Piper” to build marketing capabilities and post-sales servicing. In contrast, South Korea focused 
on collaborating with foreign partners confined to military aircraft manufacturers. Likewise, whereas the focus 
of Korean manufacturer was on enhancing technological capabilities in military aircraft, that of Brazilian 
manufacturer “Embraer” was improving its technological capabilities with the strategic purpose of diversifying 
aircraft production by engaging in commercial aircraft industry. 
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Fig. 6. Import of military aircraft to Korea, Brazil, and China 
 
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 
Note: The period over 1950 to 2012 
 
Fig. 7. Technology acquisition strategies adopted by the three latecomers 
 
Source: Elaborated from the analysis in this article 
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4.2. International technology transfer and latecomers’ technological advancement 
4.2.1. China 
 The first technological advancement in China’s military aircraft extends from 1957 to 1977. The J-6 
was the first Chinese-produced product which benefited from licensing agreement made in 1957 and 1959 with 
the Soviet Union. Through this project, China gained their competence in manufacturing the necessary tooling 
and assembling the aircraft. However, when Soviet advisors and its technical assistance withdrew after Sino-
Soviet split, China had to focus on reverse engineering of aircraft previously purchased from the Soviet Union. 
The J-7 program which was a follow-up project of J-6 provided China with opportunities to master reverse 
engineering to produce a moderate level of fighters without the support of foreign partners (Saunders and 
Wiseman, 2011). Since the economic reforms in 1978, the rest of the period was marked by enhanced access to 
Western technology for China. In 1979 China and British defense firm GEC-Marconi entered into a license 
agreement to produce the J-7II tactical fighter, as well as F-7 with a complete avionic suite. This avionics 
included radar, weapons-aiming computer and state-of-the art display systems, and marked a huge advance in 
Chinese military aircraft industry. China also cooperated with Israel starting from 1982 and obtained FBW (Fly-
by-wire) technology. Advances in Chinese military aircraft from the late 1970s to the late 1980s primarily 
resulted from the enhanced exposure to more sophisticated Western technologies. The knowledge acquired by 
collaborating with these two foreign partners led China to perform reverse engineering in modifying design to 
accommodate new systems (Saunders and Wiseman, 2011). From 1989 to 2004, China actively pursued 
acquisitions of advanced aircraft from Russia, Ukraine and Israel using a combination of co-production and 
reverse engineering to make improvement in design of subsystems and integration of advanced technologies 
into their own weapon systems. For instance, in 1996 China entered into a licensing agreement of J-11 with 
Russia which moved up China’s military aviation industry from third-generation to fourth-generation. The terms 
of the agreement were finalized and China received manufacturing document of the Su-27 along with complete 
knock-down kits from which they assembled its first two J-11s. In addition to acquisition and coproduction with 
Russia, China also continued to pursue alliance efforts with Israel. Ukraine also served as an important source 
for Russian military hardware that China had been unable to procure directly. As a result of all the efforts, China 
came up with innovations in their own indigenous capacity in building military aircraft (Saunders and Wiseman, 
2011). 
 
4.2.2. South Korea 
 South Korea embarked on their journey of technological advancement by maintaining a close 
cooperative relationship with Lockheed Martin of the U.S. The first technological advancement was marked by 
the period from 1970s to 1990s. In the early days, Korea did not have enough experience in developing and 
producing the final product, as the human resources had been accustomed to performing simple maintenance 
and production activities. Also, due to the weak industrial base for producing components and sub-systems, 
Korea had been relying on imports. In other words, the industrial base had a low value-added structure. At this 
stage, Korea had weaknesses in overall design, manufacturing and flight testing. In order to cope with the 
situation, Korea started assembling F-5E/F military aircraft throughout the early 1980s resulting from the offset 
purchase of military aircraft from Lockheed Martin. In 1986 this assembly work was extended into a follow-up 
project of F-5E/F, license production of KF-16. Under the agreement, Lockheed Martin was obliged to provide 
software tools, equipment, technical data, technical assistance and personnel payroll .With the skillful use of 
offset orders and agreements, Korea gained an important experience in enhancing production capabilities (Lee et 
al., 2009; Lee and Chung, 2011). With the establishment of KAI, Korea showed its proactive intentions to 
pursue exploration-oriented learning and achieve its status as an indigenous developer. Unlike the 
manufacturing capability which was accumulated through the assembly and licensed production projects 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, design and system integration capabilities were the weakest areas without prior 
learning experience. Korea was  able to make up for the weak points and achieve the status of an independent 
developer of military aircraft by completing “T-50” project, a state-of-the art supersonic trainer under the joint 
venture scheme with Lockheed Martin. Further details on Korea’s T-50 project are followed in the later section 
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4.3.2. The due diligence report generated by Lockheed Martin in 2001 remarked that Korea had reached the 
technological level to carry out indigenous aircraft development. To sum up, Korea effectively used this 
subcontracting agreement in the early years to build reputation and credibility, which eventually contributed to 
attracting investment of Lockheed Martin in T-50 project. 
 
4.2.3. Brazil 
 In the case of Brazil, the first technological advancement was pursued when Brazil was facing 
problems with limited knowledge and capacity to manufacture and assemble the first modern Brazilian aircraft 
prototype “Bandeirante” on an industrial scale. To cope with this issue, Embraer entered into a licensing 
agreement with an Italian firm “Aermacchi” in 1970 to produce a small jet trainer and fighter “Xavante”. This 
agreement provided Brazil with opportunities to acquire critical production knowledge in tooling and parts 
manufacturing, tracing technology and assembly of planes (Ramamurti, 1985). The second technological 
advancement in production skills of Embraer took place in 1975 with an offset purchasing of forty-nine Tigher 
II supersonic fighters. As a result, Embraer signed a licensing agreement to produce F-5 fighter parts and 
components for Northtrop. It was an offset contract Embraer signed in for the construction of a hundred F-5 
vertical fins, rudders, wings and belly pylons, against the procurement of fifty F-5. Thanks to the procurement 
made between the Brazilian Air Force and Northrop, Embraer employees learned how to efficiently implement 
cutting-edge technologies such as metal-metal bonding, aluminum-magnesium alloy machining and aluminum 
honeycomb manufacturing. A number of major technologies were learned during the process, including 
chemical milling, metal-to-metal and structural bonding and the use of composite materials. In addition, the 
contract also forced the use of numerically controlled machine tools in improving tool design, quality assurance 
and other production techniques. By the mid-1970s Embraer had acquired significant know-how in aircraft 
design, manufacturing, commercialization and servicing (Frischtak, 1994; Rodengen, 2009). Embraer also 
entered into a co-development agreement with Italian aircraft manufacturers, “Aeritalia” and aerMacchi in 1981. 
The agreement led Embraer to join the development of ground-attack aircraft “AMX” and absorb highly-
sophisticated technologies such as computer integration and fly-by-wire technology. The deal also provided 
Embraer with avionics engineering knowledge that would prove especially useful for Embraer’s future 
technological development. By the end of this development project, Brazil became technologically independent 
and gained strong military aircraft technology to carry out indigenous development programs (Balbinot, 2006; 
Rodengen, 2009). 
 
4.3. Summary of learning process and milestone projects 
Fig. 8. Process of learning-by-doing for the three latecomer countries in military aircraft sector 
 
Note: MRO for Brazil and Raw Materials for South Korea and China were not captured in our secondary data. 
The numbers in the figure refer to the order of learning-by-doing. 
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 The analysis in previous section led us to understand technological advancement in each country’s 
military aircraft industry. Based on the analysis, Figure 8 describes the process of learning-by-doing. 
Component manufacturing and assembly activities associated with learning-by-doing took place in the second 
place for all three latecomers. What differentiates one from another is that for Brazil, design and development 
was emphasized in the early stage which is a bit unusual for latecomers. In contrast, South Korea and China 
practiced their learning via maintenance, repair, and operations of purchased aircraft. As addressed in the earlier 
section, the difference is derived from the pattern of establishing knowledge-base influenced by latecomers’ 
industrial policy. However, all three latecomer countries focus on system integration activities during the last 
stage of learning-by-doing. In order to focus on this key technological capability “system integration” for CoPS, 
we have documented milestone projects of Brazil and South Korea that were carried out in the form of joint 
venture: AMX project for Brazil and T-50 project for South Korea.  
 
4.3.1. AMX of Brazil 
 Embraer entered into the co-development agreement with the two Italian firms “Aeritália” and 
“Aermacchi” to co-design and produce AMX in 1980. The project was carried out in the form of joint venture 
with a share of 46 percent for Aeritália, 24 percent for Aermacchi, and 30 percent for Embraer (Cassiolato et al., 
2002). The project was very important for Embraer, as the opportunity to gain knowledge in more advanced 
technologies was given (Neto, 1991). Indeed, Embraer became the first Brazilian company to adopt and use 
CAD (Computer-aided Design) system. In addition, the project was fundamental for Embraer to gain experience 
in managing complex business relations. For instance, Embraer was able to practice and develop expertise in 
project management and system integration by collaborating with domestic suppliers located in the cluster.  
 The first prototype of AMX flew in May 1984. The production began in mid-1986, and the first thirty-
unit batch rolled out in 1988. A second contract was signed in 1988 for Brazil to produce 25 AMX jets. A third 
production lot was authorized in early 1992. Approximately 190 AMX jets are currently in operation in the 
Italian and Brazilian Air Forces. In 1999, the AMX-T won a bid to supply Venezuela (Goldstein, 2002). Despite 
the contributions of AMX project to Brazil’s technological advancement in military aircraft industry, most of the 
AMX jets were sold to the two participant countries including Brazil and Italy which was never an export 
success (Cassiolato, 2002). 
 
Table 3 
Division of labor for Brazil and Korea’s military aircraft projects 
Project Participating firms 
Share of 
labor 
Share of 
equity Work contents 
AMX 
Embraer 
(Brazil) 30% 30% 
Wings and Elevators, Air Intakes, Pylons, Landing Gear, Fuel 
Tanks, Reconnaissance Pallet, and Installation of Cannons 
Aeritalia 
(Italy) 48% 46% 
Central Fuselage, Rudder and Fin, Radome, Fiber-Carbon 
Components for the Wings and Tail 
AerMacchi 
(Italy) 22% 24% Front and Rear Fuselage 
T-50 
KAI (South 
Korea) 50% 87% 
Prime Contractor, Aircraft Design and Integration, Major 
Component Fabrication, Mate-Thru-Delivery 
Lockheed 
Martin (U.S) 50% 13% 
Investor and Principle Subcontractor in Full-Scale 
Development, Flight Control, Avionics, and Wing 
Development, Technical Assistance 
Source: Adopted from Balbinot and Lockheed Martin 
 
 In developing AMX, the division of labor was 48 percent for Aeritalia, 30 percent for Embraer, and 22 
percent for Aermacchi. Embraer was responsible for the sections of the wing, tail unit and structure fatigue tests. 
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Aeritalia and Aermacchi would be responsible for producing the fuselage, onboard systems, and carry out the 
static tests and tests with weapons. The reason why Embraer’s work contents were concentrated on minor parts 
is that Embraer preferred a strategy whereby its engineers design the aircraft body, wings and tail but use the 
global supply chain for components (Carrico, 2013). Likewise, Embraer’s philosophy and technological strategy 
is focused mainly on the essential competencies. In the past, software and technological systems were developed 
largely within the company, but now they are ordered, purchased or jointly developed (Cassiolato et al., 2002). 
 
4.3.2. T-50 of South Korea 
 In contrast to Brazil’s case, KAI of South Korea designed and manufactured most of the parts with the 
technical support of foreign manufacturers. During the basic research phase of T-50 project from 1989 to 1991, 
Korea sought international collaboration made through offset (See Table 4). At the time, Korean defense 
acquisition regulations specified 30 percent of the purchase price as offset when purchasing weapons. Taking 
advantage of this situation, Korea was able to receive support from BAe in securing basic knowledge in aircraft 
design. Korea dispatched 24 engineers to BAe for 14 months. From 1992 to 1995, Korea collaborated with 
Lockheed Martin in designing T-50. Review sessions were held every three months which fostered the 
successful transfer of advanced knowledge in aircraft design. Market research activities led by Korean team 
resulted in forming a joint venture partnership with Lockheed Martin.  
 
Table 4 
History of T-50 development of South Korea 
Period Milestones Acquired technological knowledge Source of learning 
1989-1991 
Basic Research 
Phase 
1989: Budget Approval 
1991: Approval of Exploratory 
Development 
- Design Source Code 
- Pilot Training Programs 
- Simulation Technology 
BAe (UK) 
1992-1995 
Exploratory 
Development 
Phase 
1992-1995: Attracted Investment 
from Lockheed Martin 
- Design of Aircraft Lockheed Martin (US) 
- Design Review 
Sessions 
1996 
Bridge Program 
1996: Application of additional 
budget 
Not Observed Not Observed 
1997-2005 
Full Scale 
Development 
1997: Approval of Full Scale 
Development 
2000: Establishment of Joint 
Venture with Lockheed Martin 
2002: Success of Test Flight 
- Avionics 
- Flight Control System 
Lockheed Martin (US) 
- Technical Advisory 
2006-2012 
Post-Full Scale 
Development 
2010: Delivery to Korean Air Force 
2011: Export Agreement to 
Indonesia 
Not Observed Not Observed 
Source: Elaborated from the interview with chief engineer of T-50 project 
 
 After securing additional investment from the government through bridge program, full scale 
development began in 1997. At this phase, Lockheed Martin was responsible for providing 13 percent of the 
total cost and producing 50 percent of the total work contents including avionics and flight control system, and 
offering technical assistance to Korean engineers. Technical assistance of Lockheed Martin was provided in 
three forms: technical advisory, co-development and provision of technical documents. They also transferred the 
avionics and flight control system technologies to the Korean engineers. As a result, the prototype T-50 aircraft 
successfully completed the first flight in August, 2002 and supersonic test flight in February, 2003. In September, 
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2003, Korean Air Force approved the initial T-50 manufacturing plan. With the successful completion of the T-
50 development program, Korea entered a post-full scale development phase and Korean Air Force began to 
receive T-50 aircraft from May, 2010 and operated the new training system. The project was launched in 1997 
and, after the first trial flight in August 2002, T-50 succeeded in the supersonic flight in February 2003. A very 
significant aspect of this project was that the export contract of T-50s to Indonesia were signed in 2011, a $400 
million order for sixteen T-50s. Additional twenty-four T-50s have been exported to Iraq as well (Lee et al., 
2009; Lee and Chung, 2011). 
 
4.4. Learning outcome 
Fig. 9. Cumulative patent applications filed under the PCT in air vehicle classes 
Source: OECD Patent Database 
  
 In order to measure the learning outcome, we have gathered patent applications filed under PCT by 
referring to IPC (International Patent Classification) on lighter-than-air aircraft (B64B) and airplanes and 
helicopter (B64C). We used PCT applications as a relevant measure of learning outcome, as the patent count 
data reflects technological advancement in aerospace industry (Beaudry, 2001; Winthrop et al., 2002). In fact, 
since applying for a PCT patent involves considerable costs and time, firms file as a PCT patent applications 
inventions that they consider as important and deemed to be profitable and applicable in other countries (Noailly 
and Batrakova, 2010). Many scholars used WIPO data to compare the number of PCT patents in a number of 
industries throughout various time periods (Jung and Imm, 2002; Hullmann and Meyer, 2003; Noailly and 
Batrakova, 2010). In their patent analysis, the number of PCT patents owned by Korea in 1990s has also been 
taken into account. 
 As Brazil put immense efforts on research activities, Brazil is the only latecomer to apply for PCT 
patents from 70s to early 90s (See Figure 9). Starting from the mid-90s, South Korea and China’s technological 
learning outcome was on its way to surface. China entered into several co-production deals with Russia to 
improve its capability to develop advanced fighter aircraft. China also gained access to advanced computers in 


the mid-1990s which in turn helped China retain more sophisticated design capabilities (Saunders and Wiseman, 
2011). In a similar context, South Korea entered into a period of full-scale development for T-50 in 1997 with 
the technical support of Lockheed Martin. Above all, consolidation of existing suppliers into one system 
integrator in the late 90s for both China and South Korea may have contributed to sharp increase in the number 
of patents. Not only could patents be proxy measures for technological learning outcome, but export is a good 
proxy in innovation literature. With the rapid catch-up in generation of jet fighters and quantity-oriented 
production system, China’s export constantly has grown (See Figure 10). In contrast, Brazil’s growth in export 
market has been quite modest, since Brazil redirected their strategic focus to commercial aircraft and executive 
jets in the 1990s. South Korea has exported some products but the amount is incomparable to the former two 
latecomers. This may have been due to Korea’s relatively late entry into the military aircraft industry compared 
to Brazil and China. 
 
Fig. 10. Cumulative export of military aircraft by each of the three countries2 
 
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer 
Note: SIPRI TIV is based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons and is intended to 
represent the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer (See SIPRI Website: 
http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background/explanations2_default) 

2
 Owing to the absence of military aircraft export volume at project-level, we have adopted the cumulative 
export of military aircraft at sectoral-level. The approach is rationalized, as we have confirmed in our interviews 
and various secondary sources that Embraer for Brazil, AVIC for China, and KAI for South Korea are the 
biggest exporters of military aircraft in their respective countries. 
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 Localization rate of parts and components produced and supplied by domestic firms is another 
important indicator of defense industrial performance (Bitzinger, 2011). South Korea’s KT-1 trainer had a 
localization rate of only 44 percent, while the localization rate for T-50 advanced trainer/light attack jet was 61 
percent (Bitzinger, 2011). In a similar context, the localization rate of China’s J-11 has reached almost 100 
percent. Nevertheless, in terms design capabilities; Asian latecomers have not fully developed design and 
program management skills as evidenced by full-scale program involving global partners (Bédier et al., 2008). 
As for Brazil, more than half of Bandeirante consisted of imported parts with low localization rate (Casanova et 
al., 2009). Even after gaining indigenous technological capability, the localization rate of Embraer’s aircraft 
ranged from 50 to 60 percent which reflects the firm’s strategy of ordering and integrating parts and components 
produced abroad (Neto, 1991). As a result, Brazil still shows some weakness in local aerospace-manufacturing 
base (Bédier et al., 2008). 
 
5. Industrial policy initiatives to attain indigenous technological capability 
Based on the analysis results, we now examine government policies related to three areas: strategic, 
functional, and project initiatives. Approaching government policies from these three perspectives will provide 
groundwork for latecomers’ technological learning in CoPS (See Table 5). 
 
5.1. Strategic initiatives to set national goals 
“Although the country has had other initiatives and aircraft factories, it was in São José dos Campos that the 
modern Brazilian aerospace industry was born.” (Brazilian Aerospace Cluster) 
 The success of military aircraft industry depends on government support for R&D activities requiring 
components and parts which may be widely dispersed in terms of both industry and location (Niosi and Zhegu, 
2005). In other words, government needs to understand the importance of forming industrial clusters to support 
the R&D activities in an efficient manner. Successive Brazilian government understood its importance and 
formed an aerospace cluster in the city of São José dos Campos in São Paulo State. The education and research 
institutions including CTA, ITA, IPD (Research and Development Institute) and INPE (National Institute of 
Space Research) were established within the cluster. This group was to have considerable influence on the 
creation of Embraer later in 1969 which made the cluster region become a hub of aerospace companies. 
Although Niosi and Zhegu (2005) found that the role of universities and government laboratories is secondary in 
aerospace cluster by using the cases of developed countries, we found that the formation of aerospace cluster 
helped Brazil to concentrate key infrastructure and thereby maximize the agglomeration effect.  
 
“The senior body of China's Communist Party is the Politburo's standing committee. Making up its nine 
members are eight engineers, and one lawyer.” (Economist, 2009) 
 Since 2000, China has increased R&D spending roughly 10 percent each year and sustained their 
commitment even during the crisis period in 2008 and 2009. Such unprecedented efforts in a national innovation 
initiative are part of China’s national plan “indigenous innovation” to leapfrog into a leadership role in science-
based industry worldwide. However, this may not have been possible without recognizing the importance of 
science and technology in modern day economy. For instance in 2006, President Hu Jintao stated that “In the 
face of international scientific development and increased international competition, by seeing the development 
of science and technology as a central thread in the development strategy and actively committing to its progress, 
China can seize the opportunity for development.” One month after his speech, Chinese government announced 
the national plan “indigenous innovation” (McGregor, 2010). Likewise, technocrat leadership which recognizes 
the importance of R&D and makes a lavish investment has been a critical factor for the success of the complex 
product project at national level. 
 
“T-50 development program was initiated to stimulate Korean aerospace industry and promote its self-defense 
and own air weapons system.” (Director of Golden Eagle Engineering Research Center) 
 Before T-50 development project, Korea relied entirely on its allies for air weapons system. 
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Accordingly, the project goals were set to develop and provide an advanced trainer and key component parts to 
Korean Air Force. However, policy makers were skeptical about investing in the project. Major issues were 
Korea’s technological capabilities and inexperienced manpower to develop aircraft. In addition, there were 
insufficient societal recognition for the development and general consensus favoring the use of purchased 
aircraft. In response to these issues, new goals and needs were created to persuade decision makers. The new 
goals and needs included technological, industrial and national security perspectives. First, from a technological 
perspective, the project goals were to (a) acquire the ability to design the aircraft, (b) establish a data 
management system that efficiently secures accumulated technologies through systematic data collection, 
storage and management (c) maintain and manage manpower, and (d) acquire facilities, equipment, software 
and other tools required to develop aircrafts. In other words, the goals were created to satisfy the needs of 
Korean Air Force such as taking advantage of some important components (e.g., canopy and landing gear) 
during their operations. Secondly, the potential impact of component parts on Korean manufacturing industries 
was addressed, which would engage a number of industries and firms in Korea and its future aerospace industry. 
Lastly, from a national security perspective, the outcome of the project that could provide Korea with a firm 
foundation to pursue self-reliant defense systems was strongly put forward. With visionary leaders’ numerous 
attempts of persuasion after addressing the needs of stakeholders along with the goals above, Korean 
government was able to reach a decision to make a transition in their approach from “buy” to “make” and 
initiate T-50 development project.  
 
5.2. Functional initiatives to organize for innovation 
"ITA is the beginning of everything at Embraer” (Interview with Embraer) 
 It is important to understand that in latecomers’ setting, the role of universities and research 
institutions is critical to conducting basic research prior to the embarkation of the industry. For instance, CTA 
and ITA were created in Brazil to reinforce their strategies to acquire knowledge and self-sufficiency in aviation 
industry. Most of the first generation aeronautical engineers graduated from ITA went to work for IPD. In other 
words, groundwork for basic science research should also be prepared in academia which is the basis for applied 
research. All these institutions have become a part of CTA and played important roles in Brazilian aviation 
industry. 
 ITA: Provided high level education and research in aerospace science and technology 
 IPD: Performed R&D in aeronautical engineering, electronics, new materials and mechanics 
 IAE (Institute of Space Activities): Performed space-related R&D 
 IFI (Institute of Development and Industrial Coordination): Coordinated and supported activities to 
consolidate and develop Brazilian aerospace industry 
 
“Reverse engineering efforts led China to significant technological advancement that propelled their national 
defense industry to step forward” (Modified from Saunders and Wiseman, 2011). 
 Since the early 1950s, China established more than 400 research units to strategically focus on reverse 
engineering (Liu and White, 2001). Highly skilled Chinese scientists and engineers returned from the U.S. and 
finally the acquisition of foreign companies enabled China to access foreign technology and link up with global 
R&D. In addition, engineering and science majors have been the most favored academia in China. Among 
Chinese university graduates, 30 percent of them receive their first bachelor degree in science and engineering. 
Meanwhile, that of the U.S. only accounts for 4 percent. This indicates that China is well positioned to compete 
in advanced technology fields, even if they do not introduce dominant design in the first place (Stewart and 
Drake, 2011). This fact may also be relevant to explain the challenges that developed countries are facing in 
their emerging sectors such as energy and advanced materials. The avoidance of engineering careers coupled 
with the weakening of manufacturing industries and prevalent outsourcing practices hinders firms in developed 
countries from introducing innovations (Rotman, 2012). In particular, current trends of aviation industry reflect 
strong needs in integrating radical technologies from other sectors. Still, many firms tend to outsource 
manufacturing tasks to foreign countries in order to minimize production costs. In turn, this gives the companies 
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little chance to gain knowledge in sophisticated technology across diverse sectors. Therefore, it is critical to 
secure highly-skilled human resources and practice in-house manufacturing efforts in order to prepare for next 
generation aircraft (Delbridge and Mariotti, 2009). 
 
“T-50 is the first national project supported by private suppliers which resulted in successful collaboration with 
Lockheed Martin” (Director of Golden Eagle Engineering Research Center) 
 T-50 is the first national defense project involving a number of private suppliers. There were four 
major corporations that had previously earned the reputation as world leading exporters in manufacturing. With 
the participation of these corporations, Lockheed Martin decided to finance 13 percent of the total investment 
and produce 50 percent of the total work content for T-50 project. Not only the decision to involve private 
entities was critical in forming a joint venture with Lockheed Martin, but the long-term partnership between 
Lockheed Martin and Korea over the last 20 years was also a key enabler. In fact, Korea effectively used 
subcontracting agreement in manufacturing and assembling components in the early years to build reputation 
and credibility, which contributed to attracting investment of Lockheed Martin in T-50 project.  
 
5.3. Project initiatives to manage innovation 
“The government and the Brazilian Armed Force bought roughly a third of Bandeirantes produced before 1980. 
They usually paid up-front and directly contributed to development expenditures” (Casanova et al., 2009) 
 Brazilian government put a large amount of effort in helping Embraer with financial, marketing, 
regulatory and international activities. BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank) provided Embraer’s customers 
with alternate financing along with export support scheme and tax holidays. In addition, BNDES and other 
public sector institutions have actively supported the R&D collaboration between Embraer and other research or 
academic institutions (Goldstein, 2002). The government also imposed a steep increase import duties to foreign 
aircraft manufacturers operating in Brazil, thereby inducing foreign manufacturers to provide assembly kits to 
Embraer. 
 
“There are 33 institutes, 9 state-level key laboratories, 30 key aviation science & technology laboratories, 16 
state-certified enterprise technology centers and 32 provincial-level enterprise technology centers” (AVIC) 
 As seen from the consolidation of AVIC, China has a number of suppliers in charge of producing jet 
fighters. Unlike other countries, multiple development projects have been implemented, thereby producing over 
20,000 military aircraft of various types. As evidenced from a sheer number of different types of fighter aircraft 
produced over time, China shows its strong project capability in integrating various industrial participants in 
developing jet fighters. In fact, AVIC has become a corporation owning about 200 subsidiaries in 24 provinces 
and municipalities throughout China.  
 
“We efficiently managed and controlled the project by establishing a platform to collaborate with Lockheed 
Martin and BAe” (Director of Golden Eagle Engineering Research Center) 
 After securing the budget for T-50, the greatest problem in keeping up with the project was the low 
level of technological knowledge. For instance, there were no engineers with experience in developing an actual 
aircraft and integrating entire systems. In order to cope with this issue, Korea skillfully used offset orders with 
BAe, Lockheed Martin and other overseas counterparts to transfer some key design technologies and knowhow. 
Korean defense acquisition regulations specify 30 percent of the purchase price as offset when purchasing 
weapons. From the agreement set with BAe, BAe was obligated to (a) transfer aircraft design technologies to 
develop the T-50, (b) transfer technologies to develop a simulator for the T-50, (c) train three teams of test pilots 
(i.e., test pilots and flight engineers), (d) educate and train aero manpower, (e) and pay for all these expenses. 
For (a) and (b), BAe would transfer the technologies to twenty-four Korean researchers over a 12 month period 
and provide them with an office, designing software, equipment and researchers from their company. For (c), 
BAe would cover the expenses, such as tuition, to train three teams of test pilots. For (d), an aviation academy in 
the U.K. would be used. In addition to the offset term with BAe, Korea was able to benefit from the purchase of 
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the F-16 from Lockheed Martin. As a result, Lockheed Martin was obligated to transfer design technologies to 
Korean engineers as part of the offset deal. Lockheed Martin also provided $20 million worth of expenses 
required for the technology transfer at free of charge, including expenses for software tools, equipment, 
technical data, technical assistance and personnel payroll . 
 
Table 5 
Latecomers’ organizational capabilities for technological learning 
Policy 
dimensions Brazil China South Korea 
Strategic 
initiatives 
Formation of aerospace 
cluster to construct efficient 
R&D platform 
Lavish investment in national 
R&D projects with top-down 
support 
Transitional approach from 
“buy” to “make” by 
acknowledging the 
importance of self-defense 
Functional 
initiatives 
Establishment of research and 
education institutions for basic 
research 
Attraction of human resources 
with advanced degrees in 
science and engineering from 
developed countries 
Involvement of Korean 
conglomerates with their 
reputation as world-leading 
exporters in manufactured 
products 
Project 
initiatives 
Implementation of various 
incentives via export, alternate 
financing, etc. 
Management of multiple 
projects with various suppliers 
Skillful use of offset orders 
and negotiation to arrange 
joint venture agreement with 
foreign suppliers 
 
6. Conclusions 
 This comparative case study shows how latecomers’ technological learning should be managed with 
technology acquisitions strategies and government policies. The authors answer the question by analyzing key 
technological advancement in developing an indigenous industry in military aircraft. Important gaps in the 
literature of complex product systems have been identified and addressed by our proposed framework based on 
theories of technology acquisition strategies and CoPS. The theoretical framework has been supported by 
presenting the cases of the three latecomers. These results lead us to a discussion of the prevalent ideas in the 
literature. Both literature in traditional and latecomers’ learning mechanisms may have overlooked the sequence 
of learning from technological knowledge to production knowledge, as most of the literature focus on the 
success of East Asian economies. We have identified evidence on latecomers’ shift from technological 
knowledge to production knowledge and vice-versa, which is contingent on their focus of knowledge base 
determined by industrial policy. By shedding light on the learning sequence and its antecedent, we also find 
specific technology acquisition methods in developing aircraft systems.  
 Whereas “buy” is more aligned with latecomers with production experiences, “make” is preferred by 
latecomers with the focus on basic research and technological knowledge. From the case of Brazil, we have 
witnessed the important role played by universities and government research institutes in developing CoPS with 
a focus on design capability. This phenomenon is similar to the catching-up of Korea and Taiwan in mass-
produced goods (i.e. semi-conductor, electric products) that fostered the spin-offs and commercialization of the 
research outcomes from their universities and government research institutes. However, the institutions of the 
latter two East Asian countries have focused on production capability. Likewise, exploring the industry-specific 
success of latecomer countries bears of great importance, as they may show different technological learning 
patterns. 
 In addition, we have discovered that the role of foreign partners is crucial in acquiring highly-
sophisticated technology through co-production, co-development, and reverse engineering. Although previous 
literature in catch-up adopted the Vernon’s (1966) view that “production competence is routine or tactical and 
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thus can be exported”, we hereby learn the importance of manufacturing capability for latecomers to gain 
bargaining leverage in various joint venture schemes. As evidenced from the case of Korea, latecomer with 
higher accessibility to a foreign knowledge base tends to take advantage of their relationship with a foreign 
partner by running a close level of cooperation. In this sense, Korea has focused more on supporting existing 
export industries by producing related capital goods for foreign system integrators (Hobday, Rush, Tidd, 2000).  
 Furthermore, as evidenced from the case of Korea and Brazil, the co-development programs such as T-
50 and AMX have been effective in acquiring core and advanced technologies. However, co-development 
programs are the most difficult forms of cooperation to carry out owing to their high cost (U.S. Congress, 1990). 
In particular, since the countries with less advanced aviation industries typically pay a premium price or commit 
to purchase significant quantities, latecomer countries need to possess relatively well-developed aviation 
industries to gain a bargaining advantage in co-development programs. This is the reason why many latecomer 
countries arrange co-production programs before entering into co-development programs (Saunders and 
Wiseman, 2011). Meanwhile, latecomers with a low level of accessibility to a foreign knowledge base due to 
political and diplomatic constraints, tend to make purchases from their diplomatic allies and conduct autopsies 
in a bottom-up mode. In fact, the bottom-up mode occurs as China sees to support strategic and high technology 
industries for national purposes with the seeds of “techno-nationalism” (Hobday, Rush, Tidd, 2000).  
 We also provide policy implications. As evidenced from our cases, CoPS in latecomer context requires 
strong government interventions along with relevant policy initiatives. In this sense, latecomer governments 
should play a significant role in innovation (Hobday et al., 2000). Specifically, achieving the status of an 
indigenous developer in CoPS requires government initiatives in three areas: strategic, functional, and project. 
The first step requires having a strong strategic intention to create a viable indigenous industry not to be over-
dependent on imported goods. For instance, it is important to select a strategic industry and establish a national 
innovation cluster to spearhead and support relevant R&D activities. Although the government of these 
latecomer countries recognizes the importance of R&D, their research funding is still increasing slowly and are 
often not sufficient to stimulate and support the institutional reforms for industrial development. Secondly, 
groundwork for basic and applied research should be prepared in academia to train potential scientists and 
engineers. Also, incentives to attract and secure well-qualified human resources from abroad should be designed 
to promote the culture of technological innovation and entrepreneurship (Yoon and Lee, 2013). These two are 
important steps in securing a core knowledge base required for CoPS projects. Lastly, international collaboration 
through various mechanisms should be pursued to improve access to external knowledge, thereby fostering the 
transfer of core technology. Latecomer countries show their weaknesses in low degree of involving externalities 
in their innovation projects, due to closed organizational culture. Involving external parties into the development 
of CoPS could provide the latecomer firms with opportunities to receive investment and technical assistance. 
 The findings and implications presented in this study are beneficial to understand different patterns of 
technological learning and types of technology policies required for CoPS development programs. However, 
several limitations remain. First, due to the lack of quantitative data on the military aircraft programs, this study 
could not provide enough information on the cost and economic outcomes of the programs. Instead, this paper 
focused on technological aspects of the projects, as the cost and economic agenda were less prioritized than the 
national goal of self-defense in the analysis time frame (Davies and Brady, 2000). Despite the rationalization of 
our approach, future studies may be replicated to empirically examine the financial inputs and outputs of the 
CoPS projects, in order to better understand the economics of latecomers’ CoPS projects. Second, there have 
been some mismatches between the empirical data and the period of analysis. In order to overcome the 
limitations of the data which partially supports our argument, we have confirmed that our argument is in line 
with the comparative studies on national economic development of Korea, Brazil, and China and qualitative 
analyses results. On the whole, this study investigated multiple environments and actors within a single industry 
in order to gain a fine-grained understanding and overcome the limitation derived from the empirical data (Kim 
and Lim, 1988). 
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